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GREEN ECONOMY IN ECONOMIC THOUGHT: ORIGINS, FRAMEWORKS, AND DEBATES

Abstract

Purpose of the Research. The article aims to trace the conceptual lineage of the green economy – from Pigou's theory of externalities and Georgescu-Roegen's thermodynamic critique to current debates over decoupling and post-growth thinking and to provide a critical appraisal of the principal policy instruments advanced under this framework, evaluating their theoretical coherence and empirical track record.

Methodology of the Research. The study employs a systematic literature review and critical-analytical methodology, synthesising seminal theoretical works, peer-reviewed empirical studies, institutional reports, and policy documents. Comparative case study analysis (EU, Costa Rica, China, Nordic countries) is used to assess real-world policy outcomes. The author integrates insights from neoclassical welfare economics, ecological economics, and post-Keynesian macroeconomics to construct a multi-framework assessment.

Applied Significance of the Research. The research offers policymakers, economists, and development practitioners a structured guide to the strengths and limitations of green economy instruments – carbon pricing, green public investment, and nature-based finance – enabling more informed design of sustainability transitions.

Results of the Research. The research finds that: (1) the EU ETS, Nordic carbon taxes, and China's renewable energy industrialisation demonstrate that policy can drive meaningful decarbonisation; (2) absolute decoupling of material throughput from GDP growth has not been achieved at the required scale; (3) carbon pricing is regressive without careful revenue recycling; (4) nature-based finance instruments are theoretically contested and empirically mixed; and (5) justice and political economy dimensions remain insufficiently addressed in mainstream green economy discourse.

Originality and Scientific Novelty of the Research. The article's originality lies in its integrative approach: rather than advocating for one theoretical school, it positions the green economy as a productively contested field and maps the full spectrum of analytical traditions – from Pigouvian welfare economics to degrowth – within a unified critical framework.

Key words: Green economy, environmental economics, ecological economics, externalities, economic growth critique, market failure, political economy, ecological limits

Introduction

The tension between economic activity and the natural world has intermittently preoccupied economists at least since the classical era. Malthus’s concern with resource limits, Ricardo’s analysis of differential land rent, and Mill’s vision of a stationary state in which the “art of living” might at last be cultivated all anticipate themes that would become central to green economics. Yet for the greater part of the twentieth century, the dominant currents of economic thought – Keynesian macroeconomics, neoclassical growth theory, and development economics alike – proceeded as though the biophysical underpinnings of production were either limitless or infinitely replaceable. The natural environment appeared, when it appeared at all, as a reservoir of raw inputs

and a receptacle for waste, not as a system with intrinsic limits that economic activity is obliged to respect [10, p.183].

The emergence of the green economy as a coherent, if contested, theoretical and policy concept represents a sustained challenge to that assumption, taking two analytically distinct forms that continue to stand in productive tension. The first, rooted in mainstream environmental economics, accepts the neoclassical analytical framework while contending that market prices routinely fail to capture environmental costs, producing allocative distortions that could in principle be remedied through well-designed fiscal and regulatory measures [10, p.183]. The second, drawing on ecological economics and more recently on post-growth thought, disputes whether market failure is an adequate diagnosis of the ecological crisis, arguing instead that the compulsion to pursue continuous economic expansion is inherently at odds with biophysical sustainability [1, p.47].

From Market Failure to Structural Crisis: The Competing Theoretical Foundations of the Green Economy

The most immediate intellectual forebear of green economics is the Pigouvian analysis of externalities. Pigou’s The Economics of Welfare [10, p.183] advanced the foundational claim that divergences between private and social costs represent a category of market failure that justifies corrective state action, usually through taxation or subsidy. Environmental economics took up this framework systematically from the 1960s, driven by mounting concern about industrial pollution, the resonance of Carson’s Silent Spring, and the rise of environmental movements across the industrialised world.

Two theoretical contributions were especially consequential. Coase’s challenge to Pigou [9, p.15] held that, provided property rights are clearly defined and transaction costs are negligible, voluntary negotiation between polluters and affected parties would produce socially efficient outcomes without any need for government intervention – a finding that shifted the debate toward the institutional conditions required for environmental markets rather than tax instruments alone. Simultaneously, the scholarship on common-pool resources, later synthesised by Ostrom [9, p.15], showed that neither state regulation nor privatisation was an inevitable prerequisite for sustainable resource governance, complicating both Pigouvian and Coasian prescriptions.

A qualitatively distinct theoretical break was provided by ecological economics, whose foundational insights were drawn not from welfare economics but from thermodynamics and systems ecology. Georgescu-Roegen [4, p.276] The Entropy Law and the Economic Process offered the most rigorous early statement: applying the second law of thermodynamics, he argued that economic production is irreversibly entropic – it converts low-entropy matter and energy into high-entropy waste – and that the standard economic portrayal of production as a reversible circular flow among factors fundamentally misrepresents the physical nature of economic activity.

Daly translated this critique into a research and policy programme. His concept of the steady-state economy [1, p.47] proposed that a physically sustainable economy would need to hold its stocks of physical capital and population at levels compatible with biophysical throughput limits, while still permitting qualitative development – gains in efficiency, knowledge, and wellbeing – that do not require higher material throughput. Crucially, Daly drew a distinction between growth (the quantitative enlargement of the economy’s material scale) and development (qualitative improvement), contending that orthodox economics had collapsed this distinction and that beyond a certain threshold, growth had become genuinely uneconomic in the strict sense that its costs exceeded its benefits [1, p.47].

The phrase ‘green economy’ gained institutional standing primarily through the United Nations system. UNEP [14, p.16] Towards a Green Economy report characterised it as an economy ‘that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities’ – a formulation deliberately crafted to bridge the market-failure correction approach and broader structural concerns without fully endorsing either.

The Pigouvian framework yields a direct normative prescription: identify negative externalities,

estimate the marginal social cost of the activity generating them, and levy a tax equal to that cost. Nordhaus [8, p.11] Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (DICE) represents the most ambitious application of this reasoning to climate change, constructing an integrated assessment model that simultaneously solves for the optimal abatement pathway and the corresponding carbon price.

The framework has nonetheless attracted sustained methodological scrutiny. The discount rate is decisive: at the market rates conventionally applied (3–5%), harms occurring beyond mid-century receive negligible present-value weight, yielding low optimal carbon prices and modest near-term abatement commitments. Stern [13, p.35] famously challenged this by applying a near-zero pure rate of time preference on ethical grounds, arriving at far higher optimal carbon prices and considerably more aggressive near-term mitigation targets. Weitzman offered an independent review of the Stern Review, noting the sensitivity of conclusions to discount rate assumptions. The debate between Nordhaus and Stern [13, p.35] is not ultimately a technical disagreement about model parameters but a deeper normative dispute about intergenerational justice that the Pigouvian framework itself is incapable of resolving.

More fundamentally, Ackerman and Heinzerling (2004) challenged the commensurability assumption underpinning cost-benefit analysis – that all environmental goods can be assigned monetary values enabling trade-offs to be computed – as philosophically untenable wherever outcomes are irreversible or catastrophic. Where tipping points, non-linearities, and deep uncertainty characterise the system, as in the climate, the apparatus of welfare maximisation under risk generates indeterminate or misleading guidance.

The ‘inclusive wealth’ or ‘genuine savings’ framework draws a distinction between produced capital, human capital, and natural capital, holding that a necessary condition for sustainable development is the non-decline of the aggregate stock of all three [2, p.101]. From this perspective, GDP is a deficient welfare indicator because it treats resource depletion and environmental degradation as positive contributions to output rather than as diminutions of national wealth.

Dasgupta [2, p.101] The Economics of Biodiversity extended this framework with particular rigour, treating biodiversity as a foundational source of ecosystem services on which human welfare depends and arguing that the global economy has been depleting its natural capital base at a rate reflected neither in market prices nor in conventional national accounts.

The natural capital framework has faced objections from both neoclassical and heterodox perspectives. Neoclassical critics observe that valuing natural capital requires either market prices – frequently absent or distorted for environmental goods – or non-market valuation methods whose credibility remains contested [1, p.47]. Ecological economists, by contrast, have argued that recasting nature as a form of capital to be managed for return reproduces the instrumental logic that contributed to ecological degradation in the first place, foreclosing value frameworks – intrinsic worth, intergenerational obligation – that cannot be rendered in capital terms [1, p.47].

Much of the practical optimism surrounding the green economy rests on the decoupling thesis: that GDP growth can be sustained while resource throughput and emissions are reduced, whether relatively or absolutely. The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis – formalised by Grossman and Krueger (1991) and Panayotou (1993) – posited an inverted-U relationship between income per capita and pollution, implying that environmental quality first worsens with rising incomes but eventually recovers as greater prosperity generates effective demand for environmental protection.

The empirical literature has been broadly unfavourable for the most consequential planetary-scale pressures. Wiedmann et al. (2015), employing material footprint accounting that assigns resource use to final consumers irrespective of where production occurs, found no evidence of absolute decoupling between material consumption and GDP in high-income countries, noting that apparent domestic decoupling partly reflects the relocation of material-intensive production to lower-income economies.

Jackson [6, p.87] Prosperity Without Growth offered an influential synthesis, arguing that the macroeconomic logic of capitalist economies – the profit motive, debt-financed investment, labour productivity growth – structurally demands continuous output expansion to sustain employment and service debt, and that ecological constraints imposed by climate change and resource limits render this growth trajectory physically untenable [6, p.87].

Raworth [11, p.44] 'doughnut economics' translated a related argument into a visual and normative framework of 'planetary boundaries' (see also [12, p.472]), proposing that economic policy should aim for a 'safe and just space' bounded on the outside by nine biophysical limits and on the inside by a social foundation encompassing health, education, income, political voice, and social equity. The framework has attracted criticism, however, for the absence of a theory of economic dynamics that would explain how a doughnut-constrained economy would actually function at the macroeconomic level [6, p.87].

Instruments and Their Limits: Carbon Pricing, Green Investment, and the Financialisation of Nature

Carbon pricing is the instrument most directly derived from Pigouvian theory. Its two principal forms – a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade system – are theoretically equivalent under certainty but diverge in their distributional characteristics, revenue yields, political economy, and behaviour under uncertainty: a carbon tax delivers price certainty at the expense of quantity certainty, while a cap-and-trade system secures a defined emissions ceiling at the cost of price volatility [8, p.11].

The EU Emissions Trading System, established under EU Directive 2003/87/EC, is the world's largest functioning carbon market and the most extensively studied. The scheme's early phases were marked by over-allocation of permits, driven by pressure from industrial interests, producing carbon prices too low to stimulate meaningful abatement [3, p.53]. Structural reforms – the introduction of a Market Stability Reserve and a tighter emissions cap under the European Green Deal – have considerably raised prices. Empirical evaluations indicate that the EU ETS has reduced covered emissions, though estimates of its precise marginal contribution vary widely [3, p.53]être, 2016).

The design of revenue recycling is a critical and politically charged dimension of carbon pricing. Distributional analysis consistently shows that carbon charges are regressive in incidence, claiming a proportionally larger share of income from lower-income households, unless revenues are returned progressively – for instance through uniform lump-sum dividends or reductions in labour taxation [13, p.35].

A second cluster of instruments centres on direct public investment and industrial policy as drivers of green structural change. This approach draws less from Pigouvian welfare economics than from Keynesian and Schumpeterian traditions: the argument is not merely that market prices fail to internalise environmental costs, but that private investment is structurally inadequate to deliver the technological innovation and infrastructure build-out that deep decarbonisation demands.

Mazzucato's work on the 'entrepreneurial state' [7, p.23] and the related concept of 'mission-oriented' innovation policy (2018) have been influential in reframing green investment as a question of state capacity and strategic purpose rather than simply the correction of market failure.

Extending green economy principles into financial markets has produced a growing array of instruments – green bonds, sustainability-linked loans, biodiversity credits, payments for ecosystem services – designed to redirect private capital toward environmental ends. Green bonds, standardised through the International Capital Market Association's Green Bond Principles (2014), had grown to roughly $500 billion in annual issuance by the early 2020s [14, p.16]. However, the lack of robust independent verification and agreed standards has fuelled persistent concerns about greenwashing – the misrepresentation of the environmental credentials of financial products.

The theoretical basis for biodiversity markets is especially contested. Payment for Ecosystem

Services schemes rest on the premise that ecosystem services can be defined, measured, and compensated in ways that generate adequate incentives for conservation [11, p.44]. The empirical record on the effectiveness of such schemes is mixed, and theoretical critiques point to commodification effects – the displacement of intrinsic or relational motivations for conservation by financial ones – which may undermine the sustainability of conservation behaviour over time [1, p.47].

Lessons from Practice: Decarbonisation, Decoupling, and the Justice Imperative in Global Case Studies

The EU’s policy architecture since 2019 – consolidated under the European Green Deal – constitutes the most ambitious attempt to put the green economy into operation at supranational scale. Its institutional infrastructure spans the reformed EU ETS, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) – intended to prevent carbon leakage by applying a carbon cost to imports from jurisdictions without comparable pricing – the EU Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance, and the Recovery and Resilience Facility, which tied pandemic recovery funding to climate objectives. This architecture reflects a sophisticated engagement with the institutional complementarities required for systemic decarbonisation, moving well beyond single-instrument approaches [3, p.53].

The EU ETS offers a longer-run test case. Evidence suggests the scheme has reduced emissions in covered sectors relative to counterfactual scenarios, catalysed some technological innovation in regulated industries, and – following reform – generated substantial public revenue [3, p.53]. The CBAM adds a novel dimension by seeking to prevent competitive distortions arising from unilateral carbon pricing, though its compatibility with WTO rules and its geopolitical ramifications remain subjects of active legal and political debate [3, p.53].

Costa Rica’s Programme of Payment for Environmental Services (PPSA), launched in 1997, is the most thoroughly analysed national PES scheme in the academic literature. The programme compensates landowners for maintaining forest cover, funded through a fuel tax and international transfers. Forest cover, which had declined to around 21% of national territory by the mid-1980s, recovered to over 50% by the early 2020s– a reversal attributed in the empirical literature to the programme, though agrarian structural change and urbanisation also played a part [16, p.1].

Costa Rica also generates more than 99% of its electricity from renewable sources, principally hydropower and geothermal energy, reflecting geographical endowment as much as deliberate policy. Its comparatively high Human Development Index – among the highest in Latin America and low per-capita carbon footprint are frequently cited as evidence of the compatibility of high human development with modest material throughput. The generalisability of the Costa Rican case is, however, constrained by its small scale, specific geography, and particular institutional history [14, p.16].

China presents the most consequential and theoretically complex case study in contemporary green economy analysis. As simultaneously the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases and its largest investor in renewable energy technology, China embodies the central tension of the green economy project: the coexistence of rapid decarbonisation in certain sectors with continued expansion of carbon-intensive production in others.

China’s dominance in solar photovoltaic manufacturing – achieved through a combination of industrial policy, state investment, economies of scale, and competitive procurement – is estimated to have reduced global solar module costs by more than 90% between 2010 and 2023 [15, p.2057], with profound consequences for the economic viability of global energy transition. This is arguably the single most significant empirical contribution to the feasibility of clean energy transition, and it reflects a model of state-directed industrial policy rather than market-based carbon pricing. At the same time, China’s continued approval of coal-fired power plants illustrates the difficulty of the broader decoupling thesis in a rapidly industrialising economy [5, p.469].

Sweden, Denmark, and Finland are regularly cited in the green growth literature as cases where

high carbon prices and rigorous environmental regulation have coexisted with competitive, high-productivity economies. Sweden introduced a carbon tax in 1991 – now among the world’s highest at over €130 per tonne – alongside reductions in labour taxes, producing in theory a ‘double dividend’: reduced emissions alongside improved labour market efficiency [3, p.53]. Empirical assessments indicate that Sweden’s carbon-intensive sectors have lowered emissions without a commensurate loss of economic output [3, p.53].

The Nordic cases are important as existence proofs that high environmental ambition is not inherently incompatible with economic performance. However, the institutional and political conditions underlying Nordic environmental policy – high state capacity, coordinated wage-setting, robust labour market institutions – cannot simply be transposed to other contexts [6, p.87].

Conservative and neoliberal critics of the green economy have concentrated primarily on the efficiency costs of environmental regulation and the distributional incidence of carbon pricing. The competitiveness argument – that unilateral regulation displaces production to less-regulated jurisdictions (carbon leakage) without reducing global emissions – has shaped policy design, motivating instruments such as the EU CBAM [3, p.53]. Empirical assessments of carbon leakage are mixed; estimated leakage rates from the EU ETS have generally been lower than industry projections [3, p.53].

The distributional argument – that carbon pricing is regressive in incidence – is empirically well-grounded in the short run, though its long-run significance depends heavily on the design of revenue recycling and the adjustment costs borne by workers and communities in fossil fuel-dependent regions [13, p.35]. The ‘yellow vest’ episode in France (2018) provides a politically instructive illustration of the social backlash that poorly designed carbon pricing can unleash, especially when costs land on rural, lower-income households and revenues are not visibly returned to affected communities.

The most theoretically substantive challenge to the mainstream green economy comes from the degrowth and post-growth tradition. Hickel and Kallis [5, p.469] and others contend that the decoupling premise on which green growth rests lacks empirical support at the required scale and pace, and that the emphasis on market-based instruments and green investment within the existing growth paradigm amounts to an ‘ecological modernisation’ that addresses symptoms rather than underlying causes [5, p.469].

The structural argument holds that capitalist economies require growth to service debt, sustain employment in the face of rising labour productivity, and maintain profit rates, and that no combination of green taxes and subsidies can sever these macroeconomic imperatives from material throughput [6, p.87]. This reasoning draws on post-Keynesian macroeconomics and implies that ecological sustainability requires institutional changes to the fundamental dynamics of capital accumulation, not merely the internalisation of externalities [6, p.87].

A third line of critique foregrounds the distributional and political economy dimensions that mainstream green economy analysis tends to marginalise. In the international sphere, calls for climate justice articulated by developing countries in multilateral negotiations carry a legitimate theoretical point: the atmospheric accumulation of greenhouse gases is primarily the product of industrialisation in the global north, yet the costs of mitigation fall disproportionately on countries that have contributed least to the problem and have the least capacity to finance the transition [12, p.472].

The concept of a ‘just transition’ – which has migrated from trade union advocacy into mainstream policy discourse, including the ILO’s Guidelines for a Just Transition (2015) – represents an attempt to address the sectoral dimension, ensuring that workers and communities dependent on fossil fuel industries are not left behind by decarbonisation policy. The theoretical frameworks for operationalising just transition – questions of who bears responsibility, for what, to whom, and over what horizon – remain insufficiently elaborated in the economics literature [5, p.469].

A body of heterodox and political economy scholarship has challenged the extension of market logic and commodity forms into ecological domains. The creation of carbon markets, biodiversity credits, and payments for ecosystem services involves defining tradeable property rights over atmospheric absorption capacity, species, and ecological functions – processes that critics argue enclose commons and subordinate ecological rationality to financial rationality [1, p.47]. From this perspective, green finance instruments do not simply extend market efficiency to new domains but constitute a form of accumulation by dispossession that reproduces the structural dynamics responsible for ecological degradation in the first place [1, p.47].

Conclusion

The green economy, as a theoretical and policy concept, is best understood not as a settled paradigm but as a site of productive contestation between fundamentally different diagnoses of the ecological crisis and correspondingly different prescriptions for addressing it. The neoclassical environmental economics tradition, with its emphasis on externality correction, optimal carbon pricing, and market-based instruments [10, p.183; 8, p.11], provides technically sophisticated tools for improving the efficiency of environmental governance within existing economic structures. The ecological economics and post-growth traditions, by contrast, challenge whether efficiency improvements within the growth paradigm are capable of delivering the scale of environmental transformation that biophysical limits demand, and call for more fundamental institutional change [4, p.276; 6, p.87].

The empirical record remains, as yet, sufficiently ambiguous to sustain both perspectives. The EU ETS, Nordic carbon taxes, and China’s renewable energy industrialisation demonstrate that deliberate policy can drive meaningful decarbonisation [3, p.53; 15, p.2057]. The persistent failure of high-income economies to achieve absolute decoupling of material throughput from output growth [5, p.469], the continuing acceleration of biodiversity loss despite three decades of conservation finance [2, p.101], and the accumulating evidence of non-linearities and tipping points in Earth system dynamics [12, p.472] all lend force to the ecological economics critique.

What the convergence of these theoretical debates with urgent empirical realities suggests is that the green economy requires both the precision of neoclassical analytical tools and the structural imagination of heterodox traditions, and that the disciplinary and ideological boundaries separating these traditions have themselves become an obstacle to the quality of economic thinking that the twenty-first century demands.

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İqtisadi fikirdə yaşıl iqtisadiyyat: mənbələri, nəzəri çərçivələri və mübahisələr

Xülasə

Tədqiqatın məqsədi. Bu məqalənin məqsədi yaşıl iqtisadiyyat anlayışının konseptual inkişaf trayektoriyasını izləməkdir ki, Piqunun xarici effektlər nəzəriyyəsindən və Georgescu-Roegenin termodinamik tənqidindən başlayaraq müasir dekaplinq (decoupling) və post-artım yanaşmalarına qədər , həmçinin bu çərçivə daxilində irəli sürülən əsas siyasət alətlərinin nəzəri uyğunluğunu və empirik nəticəliliyini tənqidi şəkildə qiymətləndirməkdir.

Tədqiqatın metodologiyası. Tədqiqat sistemli ədəbiyyat icmalı və tənqidi-analitik metodologiyaya əsaslanır. Əsas nəzəri əsərlər, etibarlı empirik tədqiqatlar, institusional hesabatlar və hüquqi-normativ sənədlər sintez edilir. Real siyasət nəticələrini qiymətləndirmək üçün müqayisəli keys təhlili (Avropa İttifaqı, Kosta-Rika, Çin və Skandinaviya ölkələri) tətbiq olunur. Müəllif çoxçərçivəli qiymətləndirmə qurmaq məqsədilə neoklassik rifah iqtisadiyyatı, ekoloji iqtisadiyyat və post-keynsçi makroiqtisadiyyat yanaşmalarını inteqrasiya edir.

Tədqiqatın tətbiqi əhəmiyyəti. Tədqiqatın nəticələri siyasətçilər, iqtisadçılar və inkişaf mütəxəssisləri üçün yaşıl iqtisadiyyat alətlərinin – karbon qiymətləndirilməsi, yaşıl dövlət investisiyaları və təbiətə əsaslanan maliyyə mexanizmləri üstünlükləri və məhdudiyyətləri barədə sistemli yanaşma təqdim edir və davamlı inkişaf keçidlərinin daha əsaslandırılmış şəkildə formalaşdırılmasına imkan yaradır.

Tədqiqatın nəticələri. Tədqiqat göstərir ki: (1) Aİ-nin emissiya ticarəti sistemi, Skandinaviya ölkələrinin karbon vergiləri və Çinin bərpa olunan enerji sahəsində sənayeləşmə siyasəti dövlət siyasətinin əhəmiyyətli dekarbonizasiyanı təşviq edə bildiyini nümayiş etdirir; (2) maddi resurs istifadəsinin ÜDM artımından tam ayrılması tələb olunan miqyasda təmin olunmamışdır; (3) karbon qiymətləndirilməsi mexanizmləri gəlirlərin düzgün yenidən bölüşdürülməsi olmadıqda reqressiv xarakter daşıya bilər; (4) təbiətə əsaslanan maliyyə alətləri nəzəri baxımdan mübahisəlidir və empirik nəticələri birmənalı deyil; (5) sosial ədalət və siyasi iqtisadiyyat aspektləri yaşıl

iqtisadiyyatın əsas diskursunda kifayət qədər əks olunsa daha səmərəli olar.

Tədqiqatın elmi yeniliyi və orijinallığı. Məqalənin elmi yeniliyi onun inteqrativ yanaşmasındadır: hər hansı bir nəzəri məktəbi üstün tutmaq əvəzinə, yaşıl iqtisadiyyat məhsuldar mübahisə sahəsi kimi təqdim olunur və müxtəlif analitik ənənələr – Piqu tipli rifah iqtisadiyyatından “degrowth” (artımsız inkişaf) konsepsiyasına qədər vahid tənqidi çərçivədə sistemləşdirilir.

Açar sözlər: yaşıl iqtisadiyyat, ətraf mühit iqtisadiyyatı, ekoloji iqtisadiyyat, xarici effektlər, iqtisadi artımın tənqidi, bazar uğursuzluğu, siyasi iqtisadiyyat, ekoloji məhdudiyyətlər.

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Зелёная экономика в экономической мысли: истоки, теоретические рамки и дискуссии

Резюме

Цель исследования. Цель данной статьи – проследить концептуальную эволюцию зелёной экономики: от теории внешних эффектов Пигу и термодинамической критики Георгеску-Рёгена до современных дискуссий о декуплинге и постростовых парадигмах, а также провести критическую оценку основных политико-экономических инструментов, разрабатываемых в рамках данной концепции, с точки зрения их теоретической согласованности и эмпирической эффективности.

Методология исследования. В работе применяется метод систематического обзора литературы в сочетании с критико-аналитическим подходом. Синтезируются ключевые теоретические труды, рецензируемые эмпирические исследования, институциональные отчёты и программные документы. Для оценки практических результатов проводится сравнительный анализ кейсов (Европейский союз, Коста-Рика, Китай и страны Северной Европы). Исследование интегрирует подходы неоклассической экономики благосостояния, экологической экономики и посткейнсианской макроэкономики, формируя многоуровневую аналитическую рамку.

Практическая значимость исследования. Полученные результаты предоставляют политикам, экономистам и специалистам в области развития структурированную оценку ключевых инструментов зелёной экономики – таких как углеродное ценообразование, зелёные государственные инвестиции и природно-ориентированные финансовые механизмы – что способствует более обоснованному формированию политики устойчивого развития.

Результаты исследования. Установлено, что: (1) такие инструменты, как Система торговли выбросами ЕС, углеродные налоги стран Северной Европы и промышленная политика Китая в области возобновляемой энергетики, демонстрируют способность государственной политики обеспечивать существенную декарбонизацию; (2) абсолютный декуплинг материального потребления от экономического роста не достигнут в масштабах, необходимых для устойчивого развития; (3) углеродное ценообразование может носить регрессивный характер при отсутствии эффективных механизмов перераспределения доходов; (4) природно-ориентированные финансовые инструменты остаются теоретически дискуссионными и дают неоднозначные эмпирические результаты; (5) вопросы социальной справедливости и политической экономии недостаточно отражены в мейнстримном дискурсе зелёной экономики.

Научная новизна и оригинальность исследования. Оригинальность статьи заключается в её интегративном подходе: вместо поддержки одной теоретической школы зелёная экономика рассматривается как продуктивно оспариваемое поле, в рамках которого

системно сопоставляются различные аналитические традиции – от пигувианской экономики благосостояния до теорий дегроуза – в единой критической перспективе.

Ключевые слова: зелёная экономика, экологическая экономика, экономика окружающей среды, внешние эффекты, критика экономического роста, рыночные провалы, политическая экономия, экологические ограничения.